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It is hardly disputable that one of the most salient environmental and societal im-
pacts of airport activity is noise pollution. For most airports noise pollution con-
stitutes a crucial management and political problem. Regarding the airport, the
problem is how to cope with local residents' resistance. Regarding the public au-
thority, the problem is how to implement a fair and ecient regulation of aircraft
activity. A key issue, in particular, is the spreading of aircraft movements over dif-
ferent geographical zones (the choice of routes). One key component of the problem
is the absence of residents' revealed preferences about noise pollution. Basically,
current noise regulations use command-and-control approaches and they are discon-
nected from local residents' subjective damages. Most of the discussion focuses on
technological improvements (quieter airplanes, alternative land-o and kick-o pro-
cedures) or on the denition of noise standards. The question of residents' disutility
is never addressed (see Janic, 1999; Brueckner, 2003). Recently, Brueckner and
Girvin (2009) discuss the optimal taxation of aircraft given a xed global quota of
noise emissions, but they do not consider the social cost of residents' noise exposure.
In a recent paper we have proposed a novel solution for noise regulation around
airports (\The price of silence: markets for noise licenses and airports." International
Economic Review 51(4), 1097-1125, 2010). It consists in allowing residents to sell
tradable noise licenses to airlines companies. By doing so, residents reveal their
preferences, and the market for noise licenses, when well-designed by the regulator,
implements an ecient ight activity and spreading over the routes. Furthermore,
because the rights are given to residents, local acceptability is also met. Finally, the
market provides the airline companies with an incentive to adopt quieter aircrafts.
The theoretical properties of a market for noise licenses have been discussed in the
just mentioned paper. The purpose of the current paper is to further explore some
practical issues related to the implementation of such a market. We complement the
theoretical paper by analyzing additional issues about noise licenses markets. Our
aim is to help practitioners to consider this economic instrument in the management
of airport noise.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how markets for noise li-
censes work and stresses the main features presented in Br echet and Picard (2010).
The two following sections address practical issues. Section 3 discusses how the char-
acteristics of airports and aircraft aect the design and the equilibrium of the market.
Section 4 discusses the impact of residents characteristics. Section 6 presents the
conclusion.1
1An extensive literature review is available in Br echet and Picard (2010).
22 A market for noise licenses
A major issue for many airports today is the management of noise pollution of
inhabited neighbourhoods. As airport activities locate in places with high demand
for aircraft transport, airports are naturally built within or close to the suburbs of
cities where residential density is generally high.
The starting point of the discussion about airport noise licenses lies in several
observations about residents, airlines and airport spatial structure. First, residents
incur a disutility from aircraft noise which positively aects their preferences for
a residential location away from airports. This has been reected in both surveys
(Van Praag, 2004) and hedonic price models of property values (Nelson, 2004).
Second, airports host a bunch of airline companies that oer air connections between
city pairs with various level of protability. Some city pair connections are very
protable while others have a low protability. In equilibrium the least protable
air connection has zero prot. Third, airports may operate aircraft on one or several
runways and each runway can be associated with several aircraft routes. Air trac is
organized along several routes that airplanes may take when they land and take o.
Landing and take-o routes are determined by exogenous technical characteristic, for
instance, by the direction of wind. Yet, within the same set of technical parameters,
there may exist several route possibilities. An aircraft route includes the path, the
altitude and the engine power taken by an aircraft for takeo or landing. As shown
in Figure 1, a West runway may for example direct the planes to a South-West,
West or North-West route some miles after takeo. Figure 2 displays no less than
six actual routes and three additional proposed routes from the South West runway
of Brussels airport.
Each aircraft therefore gives rise to noise disutility (t) that harms the residents
living on the ground at the distance t from the airport below a chosen route. The
intensity of the noise disutility varies with the altitude and the engine power of each
aircraft, which depends on the aircraft position on its route. As shown in Figure 3,
the total disutility hence depends on this noise intensity and the number of residents
harmed by the noise and is dierent on each point of the aircraft route.
To easily explain the main economic properties of noise licenses, we make the
three following simplifying assumptions in this section. First, we assume that only
one type of aircraft operates in the airport, so that the residents have the same
noise disutility for every aircraft ight. Second, to emphasize spatial design issues,
we suppose that residents are homogenous with respect to their disutility for noise
pollution, but they dier according to their distance t from the airport. Finally,
there is only one relevant time period, say 8:00-20:00, during which aircrafts operate.
Those assumptions will be relaxed and discussed in the next sections.
3Figure 1: Feasible routes from an airport
The purpose of this section is to explain how markets for noise licenses work.
For pedagogical purposes we rst begin with the simple case of a single route. Then
we generalize to several routes and several zones.
2.1 The case of a single route
It is rather easy to understand how markets for noise licenses work when there exists
only one route. In this case, a noise license is dened as the right for one aircraft
to y over the route and emit noise. This right is given to the residents. As a
consequence, noise licenses must be purchased by each aircraft ying over the route.
The demand for noise licenses is given by the protability of city pair connections.
If each city pair connection x makes a prot (x) and the price of the noise license
to ight the route is denoted by P, then the demand for noise license is equal to
yD(P) = #fx : (x)   P  0g (see yD(P) in Figure 3). At a positive noise license
price, the lowest protable connection is no longer viable and must close. On the
other hand, noise licenses are granted by the representative of the residents under
the unique route. This representative organizes the compensation for aircraft noise.
If the latter is utilitarian, she will consider the aggregate disutility over the route,
d(y), which depends on the number of ights and on a measure of aggregate disutility
B =
R T
0 n(t)(t) dt, where n(t) is the number of residents at a distance t from the
4Figure 2: Actual and proposed routes from Brussels airport (source: Belgocontrol)
airport on the route, and (t) is the intensity of the noise disutility as perceived by
the residents at distance t. It is to be noted that (t) measures the resident's noise
perception and disutility and is not a technical measure of noise exposure such as
the dBA index. The key of noise license markets is to allow residents to reveal their
true disutility. The representative issues noise licenses and permits aircraft to y
over the route until the aggregate marginal disutility from noise exceeds the revenue
for noise licences. The supply curve for noise licenses will be upward sloping and will
have a zero intercept under the assumption that the noise of the rst ight during
the time period implies no noise disutility (see yS(P) in Figure 4). When there
exists only one route and many independent airline companies, the representative
will exert monopsony power and set the number of noise licences that maximizes the
aggregate utility of the residents located under the route. The residents proceeds are
equal to PyS(P) and their marginal revenues to (PyS(P))0. Then, the equilibrium is
given by the equality between marginal revenues and demand: (PyS(P))0 = yD(P).
The residents below the route constrain the number of ights to yM. Because the
number of ights is equal to yo > yM in the absence of noise licenses, the requirement
5Figure 3: Distribution of noise disutility on a route
to purchase noise licenses from residents reduces the airport activity by eliminating
the least protable ights.
Residents do collect a share of the airline activity rents to compensate for their
noise disutility. Because of their monopsony power they collect more than what
would be necessary to accept the noise related to the ight activity. Nevertheless,
it is important to note that residents do not eliminate the airport activity as it is
sometimes feared by airport advocates. Indeed, airline companies face a situation
similar to the one the manufacturing rms face with union monopsonies: the latter
constrains the rms' activities and prots but do not call for their shutdown. To sum
up, the main point of this exercise is to show that noise licenses allow residents to
reveal their preferences about their noise disutility below the route and allow airline
companies to reveal their willingness to pay to operate from the aiport. This is
typically what Coase (1960) would advocate: to give property rights over noise either
to local victims (the residents) or to polluters (the aircraft companies). Since the
residents are victims of aircraft noise pollution, this naturally implies that property
rights on noise (or quietness) are granted to those residents. They are then free to
6Figure 4: Market equilibrium on a monopsony route
transfer those rights to aircraft companies by the means of noise licenses. Hence,
the regulator does not need to arbitrage between residents and airline companies for
the noise externality.
2.2 The case of several routes
More realistic is the case where the air trac controllers can direct ights over
several routes. In this case, a noise license is dened as the right for one aircraft to
y and emit noise over a specic route. There are as many types of noise licenses
as there are routes. As the reader will understand, the main feature of a market for
noise licenses is now its spatial dimension. Residents are distributed over the space
under aircraft routes and airline companies are required to buy the licenses to take
a route. In addition, each route is associated with an independent representative
who is responsible to issue noise licences in exchange for a monetary compensation.
Each representative i infers her supply of noise licenses yS
i from the aggregate noise
disutility of the residents dweling under her route. The representative is in charge
of redistributing the compensation to each individual according to the local noise
conditions.
From the air controllers' viewpoint, routes are generally good substitutes. For
instance, under good weather conditions, routing an aircraft to West or North-
7West route a couple of miles after takeo does not present technical and safety
challenges. Figure 1.b oers a good example of a handful of routes from Brussels
airport. Because routes are substitutes, aircraft are enticed to choose the routes
oering the noise licenses with the lowest price. In equilibrium, the noise license
prices of all routes must equalize and the equilibrium number of ights, yR, is given
by the aggregation of each route's supply, yS(P) =
P
i yS
i (P), and the total demand
for noise licenses, yD(P). This is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Market equilibrium with two routes
As above, the residents' possibility to sell noise licenses entices them to reveal
their preferences about noise. The intervention of the regulator is not needed after
the setup of a noise license market. In addition, dividing the space surrounding
the airport into several routes has two important properties. First it permits the
noise disutility to be spread over more individuals. When individuals are increas-
ingly harmed by additional noise events, they are less hurt by an aircraft noise event
at low trac levels than at high levels. As a consequence, it is more ecient to
rebalance ight activity from routes with high ight activity to ones with low ac-
tivity. The market for noise licenses achieves this dispersion property. Second, by
setting up several routes, the routes' representatives lose market power over aircraft
and get lower rents. The existence of rents is no surprise as rents are features of
any markets with heterogenous buyers and sellers. The market is here used to re-
8veal the preferences of both residents and airline companies about the aircraft noise
emissions.
Using markets for pollution licenses to regulate pollution is typical in the en-
vironmental economics literature. Montgomery (1972) indeed inspired the use of
tradeable permits or licenses as policy instruments for environmental issues. Since
the 1990s, many examples of markets for tradable permits have been successfully
implemented, most notably for sulfur dioxide pollution in the US power industry
(Ellerman et al., 2000) and for carbon dioxide in the European Union (see Eller-
man et al., 2010). All these markets, nevertheless, are cap-and-trade systems in the
sense where the global supply of pollution permits is set by the regulator (this is
the cap on pollution), and polluters are then allowed to trade these permits among
themselves. In our setting, the supply of licenses is endogenous, and it is based on
residents' preferences. By contrast to cap-and-trade systems, our market allows to
reveal preferences on both sides of the market.2
2.3 The case of several zones, with one route
We can nally consider the last case where aircrafts must follow a unique route, but
where this route is divided into several contiguous zones. A zone is dened as a land
strip below a route where residents are represented by a single representative. So,
there may be many zones and representatives below the same route. Figure 6 depicts
a situation where the route is divided into two zones. In this case, a noise license
is dened as the right for one aircraft to y over one zone and to emit noise there.
So, to y the entire route an aircraft must purchase a noise license for every zone.
The licenses supplied by dierent zones' representatives are perfect complements
for airline companies. Noise pollution is therefore a complementary bad for all
zones on a single route. Typically, this may lead to a tragedy of the anticommons
where the agents do not internalize the global eect of their decisions on the route
trac. The \tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) explains why people overuse
shared resources: it happens when too many owners can have a privilege to use
a given resource and no one has a right to exclude another. The \tragedy of the
anticommons" (Heller and Eisengerg, 1998) happens when a resource is prone to
underuse because too many owners can block each other and no one has an eective
privilege of use. In our context, each residents' representative owns the right to
issue noise licenses and does not internalize the benets that other zones bear. One
may conjecture that the number of licenses and ights is inecient. Another way
to see this is to observe that noise licenses oered by dierent zones on a same
route are complementary goods. Therefore the market for noise licenses may be
2See Ellerman (2005) for a broad introduction to markets for tradable pollution permits.
9suspected to be subject to under-provision of complementary goods. Independent
suppliers of complementary goods would set ineciently low output levels because
they would not internalize the eect of the benet of a larger supply of their goods
on the other suppliers. Br echet and Picard (2010) show that those eects exist but
are nevertheless under the control of the market designer.
Figure 6: Designing a route with two zones
Br echet and Picard (2010) propose to organize the market with a neutral auc-
tioneer who collects the noise license price bids supplied by the zone representatives
and who sell to each aircraft the bundles of noise licenses on all zones at a price
equal to maximum bid price times the number of zones. This means that the zone
oering the bid with the highest noise license prices receives exactly what it bids.
This zone is called the critical zone because it determines the price to y over the
whole route. The other zones receive more than what they bid. Such a situation
corresponds to a standard market equilibrium where the marginal transaction gives
no rent to the marginal supplier but inframarginal transactions grant some positive
rents to inframarginal suppliers. In this context, the equilibrium in the noise license
market can be represented as in Figure 7. Let di(yi) be the aggregate noise disutility
over the zone i for a trac intensity yi over the zone. This is the disutility that
zone i's representative considers in deciding its price bid for a noise licence. The
bid price of a zone i's representative is then determined by her marginal disutil-
ity d0
i(yi). The market auctioneer picks the largest bid price maxi d0
i(yi) and sets
10the price of the route P Z = 2maxi d0
i(yi). The resulting number of ights is then
given by the aircraft demand to y on the route yZ = yD(P Z). The zone i with







that the market designer can tune the level of this rent by altering zones' spatial
design. Indeed, if she reduces the size of the critical zone, aircraft noise will aect
fewer residents in this zone and will therefore reduce the aggregate disutility and
the marginal disutility over this zone, which in turn reduces the critical zone's bid
price and therefore the rents given to other zones. The important point is that
the tragedy of the anticommons can be signicantly reduced in this setup by an
appropriate design of the zones on the routes.
Figure 7: Market equilibrium with two zones
To sum up, the combination of noise licenses given to residents with an appropri-
ate spatial design of aircraft activity around airports is an appealing solution for the
management of noise pollution around airports. The market for noise licenses yields
an ecient allocation of ights across routes, a solution that airport charges on
aircraft movements cannot achieve. By increasing the number of routes the market
designer can spread the noise disutility where it has the lowest social cost and she
can reduce the residents' rents in eliciting their information about noise disutility.
By creating appropriate zones the market designer can delegate the revelation of
noise disutility to smaller spatial groups of residents and limit the problem of the
tragedy of anticommons.
11The above model is denitively an over-simplication of a complex reality. We
now extend our discussion to issues related to airport and aircraft characteristics.
3 Taking aircraft and airport characteristics into
account
In this section we focus on the impact of aircraft and airport characteristics on noise
licenses and airport trac. For simplicity we assume that the market designer has set
up several routes so that the residents' representatives are price takers. As a result,
their supply of noise licences can be aggregated in a unique supply function yS(P).
We sequentially address the issues of aircraft noise heterogeneity, wind contingencies,
time schedules and capacity constraints, hubs and airport extensions.
3.1 Aircrafts heterogeneity
Our earlier focus was on the management of noise pollution across space, not the
management of the aircraft eet. We therefore abstracted from possible noise het-
erogeneity across aircraft types by assuming that aircraft noise is homogenous. In
practice, aircraft vary in size, weight, power, age, and other parameters that aect
their noise impact on the ground.
Noise licenses can easily be dierentiated according to the aircraft types and
their noise pollution. A noise license could be issued for each type of aircraft on a
given route or zone. Zones' representatives would therefore reveal their preferences
for each type of aircraft by oering a price bid for each of them. In particular, they
would set higher noise license prices for noisy aircraft types. The representatives and
their residents would hence make the trade o between more and less noisy aircraft
types by setting high and low prices to y over their routes. Price dierentials would
in turn give incentives to airline companies to choose the socially ecient aircraft
type. Indeed, airline companies internalize residents' noise disutility through the
purchase of noise licenses for each of their aircraft; it can readily be shown that, as
in Coase (1960), those companies ultimately maximize the sum of their prots and
the noise disutility they generate. As a result, dierentiated noise licenses would
not only solve the information revelation problem about noise disutility but it would
also induce more ecient compositions of aircraft eets.
Although compelling, this solution suers from the drawback of complexity.
There indeed exist too many aircraft types, and each aircraft can undertake tech-
nical improvements for noise reduction, which should also be taken into account.
So, it appears unrealistic to ask residents' representatives to oer a bid for each
12movement of aircraft. A more realistic solution is then to deal noise heterogeneity
across aircraft types with a Quota Count system. As explained in detail by Oller-
head and Hopewell (2002), the Quota Count (QC) System was introduced as part
of a new night restrictions regime for Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted in 1993.
Each aircraft movement is given a specic noise quota for each airport according to
the QC classication. The QC classication is intended to reect the contribution
made by an aircraft to the total noise impact around an airport. QC classications
measure noise in relative terms: a QC/2 aircraft is deemed to have twice the impact
of a QC/1 aircraft, a QC/4 aircraft has four times the impact, and so on. The QC
classications of aircraft are determined from their certicated noise levels. Two
options are available to the market designer. On the one hand, she can categorize
aircraft types into a small number of QC ranges and require residents to oer noise
license bids for each range, for instance, for the four ranges QC/1, QC/2, QC/3 and
above. The price for each range will reect residents disutility for each noise range.
This solution allows the market to elicit the value of the noise disutility but may still
seem too complex. On the other hand, the market designer can organize a market
for QC licences; that is, a market for one type of noise range, for instance QC/1.
The market designer must then set conversion rates on the price paid for aircrafts
with other QCs. Here conversion rates are no longer endogenous and may no reect
the disutility dierences between noise events. However, equivalences between noise
experiences have been investigated3 and the resulting conversion gures could be
judged as fair approximations. In this matter, the balance is between complexity
and accuracy.
3.2 Wind contingencies
Strong winds can force the air trac control management to direct taking-o ights
to the routes opposite to the winds. In most of airports, winds ow from the West
80% of the time and weather forecast agencies provide a good annual prediction of
expected wind directions. Wind contingencies raise two issues, before and after the
purchase of noise licences by airline companies.
Consider on the one hand that wind contingencies arise after the purchase of noise
licences. Airline companies purchase their books of noise licences at the beginning
of the time period during which licenses are valid. At the end of the time period,
airline companies must clear their license books so that the number of ights must
not exceed the number of purchased noise licenses on routes and zones. However, it
may be that wind contingencies force airline companies to put a larger than expected
3See, e.g., Miedeman and Oudshoorn (2001).
13number of ights on some routes. There should be some possibilities to adjust the
realization to the expectation of the use of routes.
Our above discussion focuses on a primary market between residents and airline
companies. This market is supposed to clear on a regular basis, say quarterly.
To solve the present issue, a secondary market may coexist with the primary one.
It would consist in trading licenses among airline companies. As in the case of EU
Emission Trading Scheme on CO2, the secondary market can be informally organized
as a set of bilateral trades between airline companies, or it can be organized formally
in a set of continuous markets (one for each route and ight time period; e.g. North-
West 7:00-20:00). Stochastic features can alter the day-to-day demand of licenses,
for example because of weather conditions or changes in travel demands. If at some
time period an airline company needs more (or less) licenses for a route than it
owns, then it can buy (or sell) them on the secondary market. Naturally, the total
number of licenses for each zone is given for the time-span covered (resulting from
the primary market clearing), but the exibility provided by the secondary market
would allow absorption of transitional stochastic shocks. The assumption behind
this design is that expectations are not biased. Since the number of licenses on each
route is xed during the quarter, it will always t the optimal one that resulted from
market clearing in the primary market.
There may however be discrepancies between the expected aggregate supply of
route and the actual demand for routes. For instance, weather forecasts are not
realized perfectly. Airline companies can then become short on certain routes and
long on others. Then, airline companies will manage noise licenses according to a
portfolio approach, taking into account the risk of becoming short on licenses. They
will minimize this risk by buying a portfolio of noise licenses that match more than
their need for the dierent routes. They will indeed make a precautionary savings
of licenses to cope with such uncertainty. The price of licenses will incorporate an
option premium for route availability.
One way for the regulator to minimize this precautionary savings is to allows
for the banking of licenses. Banking would allow an airline company to keep some
licenses for use in the next period. If we consider that licenses are valid only for
one time period (say again a quarter), then banking would allow the rm to save
some licenses for the next quarter. Banking should be restricted in time (not more
than one quarter) and in amount (not more than a given proportion of the quan-
tity purchased each period) to avoid the phenomenon of hot spots or congestion.
Alternatively, the regulator may use a penalty (per ight) paid by the companies
that do not comply ex post with the noise licenses quota established in the primary
market. The penalty will be returned to residents, because the actual number of
ights exceeds the one resulting from the primary market clearing.
14Consider on the other hand that wind contingencies arise before the purchase of
noise licences so that wind directions are on average biased toward a particular route
r (typically a Western route). Air trac control must then force aircraft to demand
noise licenses more often on route r. Such wind contingencies then determine a
minimal share of the noise licenses ymin
r demanded on this route. As shown in the
left hand panel of Figure 8, the noise license demand is innitely inelastic at ymin
r
and then becomes elastic for larger number of ights. It is straightforward to see
that the equilibrium price is unaltered as long as wind contingencies do not constrain
too much the genuine demand of noise licences. Because the marginal aircraft using
route r can substitute with another route, the price of noise permits should then be
equal across routes and the allocation of ights over routes follows from the market
equilibrium. By contrast, if wind conditions strongly constrain the demand on route
r, as shown in the right hand panel of Figure 8, the noise license price is higher and
the trac on the route is larger compared to a situation were wind conditions are
ignored. In particular, the equilibrium price on that route is given by the market
clearing between supply yS
r (P) and minimum demand ymin
r . Because the marginal
aircraft using route r is unable to substitute with another route, the noise license
price on route r is also higher than on other routes. The equilibrium on other routes
is determined as before by their residents' supplies and by the residual demand
(yD(P)   ymin
r ).
Figure 8: Market equilibrium with wind contingencies
153.3 Time schedules and capacity constraints
Air trac has to conform to various time schedule contingencies. Most of the latter
are imposed by the behavior of air transport consumers and connectivity. In par-
ticular, business consumers are usually bound to day work schedules so that trips
must be organized in the beginning and the end of the work day. Also, connectivity
entices airline companies to organize their ights from and to hub airports where
passenger transit occurs within particular hour ranges. This results in peak-time
movements during which congestion may occur. In many airports, peak time trac
leads to the congestion of runway(s) which reaches their limit capacity.
To understand this issue, we propose the four following examples. The peak and
o-peak demands for noise licenses are given by yD
peak(P) and yD
off(P) and the noise
license total supply by yS(P). In the rst example we suppose that the number of
ights is not limited to the runway's capacity. We also suppose that on-peak air
trac can move to o-peak time schedules without cost and that noise licenses are
not dierentiated according to the peak and o-peak time periods. This can proxy
tourist trac where tourists are not constrained by tight schedules. This also means
for instance that noise licenses are issued for a time period between 8:00 and 22:00
which includes the 8:00-10:00 and 16:00-18:00 peak hours. Figure 9 shows how the
equilibrium can be constructed. First, the rst and second panels display the peak
demand yD
peak and the o-peak demand yD
off. The third panel shows the aggregation
of the two demands. Since the noise licenses are homogenous, the noise license
market aggregates the demands on both markets, which includes a total demand of
yD
peak + yD
off ights. The equilibrium price P  results from the intersection of the
noise license supply and total demand. Since noise licences are homogenous they
have the same price. Note that if the noise disutility is relatively strong, the license
supply can become so steep that the noise license price is higher than the intercept
of the o-peak demand. The noise market can therefore imply the exit of o-peak
ights.
In the above example, aircraft activity and noise is concentrated on peak times. It
might be that residents are dissatised by such an outcome and wish to dierentiate
between the time periods. The market designer can achieve a more ecient solution
by setting two types of noise licences, one for peak and one for o-peak time period.
This second example is shown in Figure 10. In equilibrium, the noise license price is
higher during peak time, which gives incentives to airline companies to shift some
ight activity to o-peak time periods. This example shows that more dierentiation
of noise licenses implies a more ecient allocation of ights and noise. As mentioned
before, this nevertheless comes at the cost of a more complex system of licenses.
An additional discussion can be oered when we consider capacity constraints.
16Figure 9: Peak/o-peak and one noise license
In the following third example, we use the rst case where on-peak air trac can be
shifted to o-peak time schedules without cost and noise licenses are not dierenti-
ated according to the peak and o-peak time periods. In addition, we assume that
the number of ights is limited to the runway(s) capacity K. Figure 11 shows how
the equilibrium is constructed. First, on can observe in the rst panel that, for low
enough noise license prices, the peak demand yD
peak is not completely served. The
unserved peak demand yD
peak   K is moved to the o-peak demand yD
off to result
in a o-peak residual demand yD
res = yD
off + yD
peak   K in the second panel. The
third panel shows the aggregation of demand functions. Since the noise licenses
are homogenous, the noise license market aggregates the demands on both markets,
which includes a total demand of yD
peak + yD
off ights at high enough prices. For
small prices, the total demand is the same since the peak demand is equal to K and
the o-peak is equal to yD
res, which sums to yD
peak + yD
off: The equilibrium price P 
results from the intersection of the noise license supply and total demand. Hence
the capacity constraint in peak time periods does not impact the noise licence price.
However, the noise license partly substitutes for the fee A that the airport could
have extracted from an auction on the peak time slots without noise licenses.
The contention between the noise licenses and revenues from airport capacity
management is conrmed by the last example. To make things simple, we now sup-
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pose that on-peak air trac cannot be reported to o-peak time schedules and that
noise licenses are dierentiated according to peak and o-peak. This will happen if
peak time consumption is mainly for business purposes and o-peak consumption
for tourism. For example, an aircraft must purchase separate noise licenses for the
8:00-10:00 and 16:00-18:00 peak hours and for the other o-peak time periods. As
shown in Figure 12, two situations can occur according to the steepness of the supply
function yS(P). First, as shown in the right hand panel, if the noise license supply
is steep enough, the equilibrium in the noise permit market takes place at P 
peak
and reduces the peak trac below the runway capacity K. The capacity constraint
is not binding and has no eect on the noise license market. However it can have
an eect on other markets or instruments. For instance, some airports manage the
runway capacity by using an auction. Without noise licenses, the auction allows the
airport to eciently allocate ights and to raise a fee equal to A. Because the noise
license supply removes the capacity constraint, this fee can no longer be collected.
Second, as shown in the left hand panel, if the noise license supply is at enough,
the capacity constraint is binding and the noise license price is equal to P 
peak. This
price is lower than the fee A, so that the airport can raise only A   P 
peak per ight
in presence of a market for noise licenses whereas it would raise A without it. This
analysis shows that noise licenses can therefore directly conict with the airport
18Figure 11: Peak/o-peak with perfect substitution
nances when there exist capacity constraints.
The above discussion suggests that capacity constraints and peak time congestion
impact on the price of noise licenses and involve revenue shifts from airport managers
to local residents. Such potential loss of airport revenues adds to the revenue loss
from air trac reduction created by noise licenses.
3.4 Hubs and ight connections
Most airline companies use some specic airports as hubs, that is, a connection node
for their passengers and ights. By organizing ight connections those companies
are able to propose more destinations and cheaper prices to customers. In addition
to better connectivity, hubs allow airline companies to save on the costs that are
subject to economies of scale and scope such as terminal costs and service costs.
Large airline companies are also able to exert stronger negotiation power in dealing
with the airport management of the hub airport they use, with a result of smaller
prices for ground services. When such a negotiation power is not strong enough,
large airline companies tend to integrate their hub airport or to use binding long term
contracts. As hubs are an increasingly important feature of current air transport
industry, it is important to analyze the impact of noise licenses on them.
The basic feature of ight connectivity and hubs is that ights are organized in
19Figure 12: No peak/o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a "star" network and that the protability of connected ights are interdependent.
The simplest way to understand the impact of noise licenses is to consider the
example of a hub airport with a single airline company that has a xed cost of
operations F and operates a set of n ights with same protability (x) = . When
noise licenses have a price P, the prot of the bundle of connected ights is given
by n(   P)   F. Hence, if P < P B     F=n, the bundle of ights is protable;
otherwise the airline must consider stopping its hub activities in the airport. As
shown in Figure 13, the demand for noise licenses is now kinked so that yD
1 (P) = n
if P < P B and 0 otherwise. The noise license market equilibrium works as follows.
When the noise disutility is not too strong, the noise license supply curve is not to
steep so that the market equilibrium take place at a price P  and for the hub ight
activity n. Otherwise, if the noise disutility is too strong and the supply curve too
steep, then the equilibrium eliminates this hub activity.
This example is only illustrative and does not represent a practical airport situa-
tion. In practice, the complementarity caused by ight connectivity is not so strong
and there exists no unique level of hub activies. Indeed, shutting one connection
does not always simultaneously cause losses for all other connections. Flight con-
nections may be clustered in several networks that are not too interdependent as
it can be the case for connections to business and touristic places. The demand
20Figure 13: Hub airports
for noise licenses more likely looks like the smooth curve yD
2 (P) rather than yD
1 (P).
As a consequence, the introduction of noise license markets will certainly aect the
airport hub activity level and triggers a series of ight connection shutdowns. It is,
however, much less certain that it leads to shutting down of a hub airport. Finally,
it is worth pointing out that such an eect does not hinge on the existence of noise
permits market since a tax on ights yields the same eect.
3.5 Airport planning and extension
Noise licenses can be introduced in a new airport. In the past, noise and environmen-
tal issues have usually been dealt with by urban planers and political institutions
who have enticed/imposed investors to set the new airport activities away from a
dense urban area. New airports have been located away from dense areas (e.g.
Mirabel in Quebec) or even on reclaimed land (e.g. Kansai in Japan) partly because
of noise considerations. The above discussion about noise licenses directly applies
to new airports. In this case, the airport investment decisions can be delegated
to public investors as is usual but they can also be delegated to private investors
who shall assess the protability of their airport projects using their anticipation
of the noise license market. Because noise licences oblige airlines to internalize the
noise externality and reduce their willingness to pay for the airport infrastructure,
21they also oblige public or private investors to consider the noise damage around the
airport. If investors anticipate correctly the noise license price, their decisions must
correspond to the social optimal ones. In this case, the public and private investors
also have incentives to make adequate environmental studies to measure the disutil-
ity of residents and the possible compensations. So, such studies can be left to the
responsibility of the investors whenever they are public or private entreprises.
Nevertheless, most of the complaints on noise externalities concern airports that
extend their activities. The above discussion about noise licenses also applies but
brings about new features. To simplify our discussion we assume that an investment
for y1 aircraft movements has been sunk on a rst terminal when the air trac
demand was low and that the demand is now high so that an investment K can
be now made for a second terminal to expand trac to y2. We also assume that
airport is non-prot and self-nanced so that the investment cost must be covered
by an airport tax t that applies to all aircraft movements. Indeed, although the
privatization of some airport services has been in the air for two decades, airport
infrastructure is usually planned by (local) governments. The same argument would,
however, be made about a private investor who is imposed a regulated return-on-
investment that caps her airport prots. (See Basso and Zhang, 2007, for a discussion
about airports' objective functions). The new terminal investment is equal to c(y) =
K + vc  (y   n1) where K is a xed cost and vc a variable cost measured in terms
of aircraft movements, which is typically the cost of a new gate divided by the total
number of ights at this gate during the investment time period. The tax t must
therefore be equal to the average investment cost ac(y) = c(y)=y where y is the total
number of movements. The xed cost is usually more important than the variable
cost so that ac is generally a decreasing function (which happens if K > vc n1) but
it can be an increasing function without loss of generality. The prot of each city
pair connection y is given by (y) P  t so that airlines serve city pair connections
with prots higher than (y) > P + ac(y) where P is the noise license price. This
is shown in Figure 14 where d0(y) is the noise disutility, or the inverse supply of the
noise licenses, yS(P). The equilibrium investment is reached at the capacity level
y
2. This analysis allows us to make two points.
First, the presence of a noise license market diminishes the size of the airport
extension (y
2 < yo
2) because the noise licenses augment the cost of each ight and
therefore force the least productive one out of the market. It can even block the
airport extension if the capacity increase is not large enough. In Figure 14, this
occurs when the past investment capacity y
0
1 is larger than the equilibrium capacity
y
2. So, when the extension investment and the implementation of a noise license
market are bundled, the investor must internalize the noise externality that was
previously not considered. Second, the noise license market introduces a rent to
22Figure 14: Airport extension
residents, P y
2, that encompasses all past and new aircraft movements. Residents
are therefore compensated for a noise disutility that was already present. This could
constitute an unfair windfall, in particular when noise disutility has already been
incorporated into housing prices and cashed by residents who settled there when
the noise was present. It is nevertheless possible to reduce this rent and to keep
the properties of the market for noise licenses by restricting the compensation for
noise licenses only to the new ights on the routes. This would give a rent to equal
to P (y
2   y
1) that would compensate only for their noise disutility caused by the
new terminal. This however brings a revenue P y
1 that could be returned to the
government, redistributed as lump sum to residents or airlines, or used by the airport
facility.
To sum up, noise licenses can be embed in the planning of new airport or ex-
tension projects. The introduction of noise licenses generates a rent to residents. In
the case of an extension project, this rent can be partly recouped by government or
airport management by restricting the compensation for noise licenses to the only
new ights. This leads us to the next section.
234 Taking residents characteristics into account
After having discussed how some features related to the airport (the demand side
of the market) can be managed with the market for noise licenses, we now turn to
some issues related to local residents (the supply side of the market). Three main
issues deserve to be discussed: victim activism, the role of local representatives, and
the management of the resident's rent associated to the market for noise licenses.
4.1 Victim activism
Under a market for noise licenses, the equilibrium shares the \victim activity" prop-
erties presented by Baumol and Oates (1988). In the short run, residents may take
inappropriate decisions to increase their compensation from the noise licences. In
particular, residents may avoid taking sound proong measures. In the long run,
individuals may prefer to stay in or relocate into noisy areas because of the com-
pensation they can enjoy there. We here show that the argument of victim activism
does not apply in the short run whereas it applies in the long run and calls for
specic urban control measures.
It can be argued that noise licenses introduce some victim activism that dimin-
ishes incentives to invest in sound proong measures. Accordingly, residents would
increase the noise damage to collect additional compensation. This does not prove
to be correct as the following simple model shows. Suppose that routes are rep-
resented by utilitarian representatives and that individuals could reduce the noise
disutility by investing in noise protection measures. Each resident's disutility is
given by dr(x;a;t) where x is the number of aircraft events, a is the soundproong
protection investment and t is the resident's distance on the route r. The disutility
is assumed to increase in x and decrease in a while the marginal disutility of an
additional ight on the route decreases with soundproong dxa < 0. The cost of
the investment is assumed to be the increasing and convex function c(a). Each city
pair connection x 2 < brings a prot equal to (x). A utilitarian planner nds the
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Consider now a noise license market where route representatives decide about the
soundproong protection of each resident at location t. Let the noise license price be
24P. At the equilibrium, the demand for noise license is given by (y) = P . The ob-
jective of the route r's representative is U(xr;a()) =  
R T
0 [dr(xr;a(t);t) + c(a(t))]dt+
Pxr. At the equilibrium price P , they supply a number of noise licenses that sat-
ises d0
rx(xr;a;t) = P  whereas they impose the soundproong protection a
r(t) at
each location t such that  d0
ra(xr;a
r(t);t) = c(a
r(t)). It is readily shown that
this equilibrium replicates the socially optimal solution. The market equilibrium
does not dier from the planner's if the representatives delegate the soundproof-
ing decision to the residents. In this case, each resident i would set ai such that
d0
ra(xr;ai;t) =  c0(ai), which yields the same equilibrium.
By contrast, a noise license market does generate victim activity in the long run.
Accordingly, any compensation scheme gives the wrong incentives to victims as they
prefer to stay in or relocate into polluted areas because of the rents they can enjoy
there. In the long run, this rent is capitalized in higher land prices and can entice
land owners to divide their land plot in smaller parcels and invite new residents to
live and collect a rent below a route. Picard and Br echet (2010) present a long run
equilibrium spatial model to highlight the negative long term eects of new residents'
entry and landlords' choice of lot size or housing structure. They show that \victim
activity" exists and needs to be addressed either by land planning restrictions and/or
by xing the number of individuals who are entitled to a compensation.
There nevertheless are several dierences between the present setup and the
traditional discussion about enviromental economics instilled by Baumol and Oates
(1988). First, this traditional discussion focuses on Pareto optimality and does
not consider agents' participation in the environmental program. In the case of
airport noise pollution, the residents' agreement for the economic activity cannot be
obtained without some form of compensation. In essence, environmental economics
supposes some redistribution through lump sum transfers to residents before any
environmental tax is implemented. To make residents participate the government
must know the disutility prole of individuals along the routes, which raises issues
about information collection and local politics (which we claim to avoid) as well
as issues of victim activity. Second, traditional environmental economists derive
and discuss extensively the value of the environmental tax but remain silent about
how information about the benet and damage of the polluting activity is collected
and aggregated in a tax rate. Noise licenses attempt to correct this weakness.
Compensation to victims is here unavoidable because it is a piece of the information
revelation process. Third, many discussions about victim activism do not consider
the entry of polluters in the area. In this model of noise licenses, airlines enter as
long as city-pair connection ights are protable.
254.2 Local institutions and representatives
A market for noise licenses is not exactly about giving the rights for quietness to
residents, but it is about giving those rights to some local institutions that represent
them along the routes that aircrafts take.
Those institutions rst solve the problems of resident heterogeneity with respect
to noise sensitivity. Noise sensibility depends not only on individuals' idiosyncratic
physical and psychological characteristics, but also on housing characteristics and
family status. For example, van Praag (2004) shows that adults raising children
and living in houses attached with gardens are more sensitive to aircraft noise.
The role of the representative is to aggregate individuals preferences and to arrive
with reasonable bids for compensation. In the process of aggregating, the represen-
tative mitigates the extreme preferences for quietness. The representative can also
distribute the compensation according to physical characteristics like the noise expo-
sure, house characteristics, and perhaps family composition. Although this function
can be performed by a central government, public economic theory suggests to dele-
gate it to more local authorities or associations because of their better knowledge of
local conditions. An additional political economic argument also suggests to dele-
gate this function to local institutions because the local population may not be large
enough to have electoral power on the central government and because the airport
and airlines are less likely to lobby and to exert pressure on local institutions.
It is important to discuss the form of the local institutions representing the res-
idents. Ideally, residents should be represented by a local planner minimizing the
local aggregate noise disutility. In democratic countries, local institutions already
exist as city councils, residents associations, communities, etc. When residents are
able to elect their representative, the representative is more likely to behave accord-
ing to the preferences of the median voter. In this case, the noise license market
will deviate from the ecient result to the extent that the median noise disutility
diers from the mean noise disutitlity. In particular, if a zone or a route includes
a minority of population that is very much harmed by noise, its representative will
accept more ights and noise events than would a utilitarian representative.
Finally, in a market for noise licenses, critical zones are the only binding zones
so that they may have market power. Although the existence of several routes put
the competitive zones in competitive environment, their small number may entice
their representatives to collude and reach a dierent market outcome. However,
the analysis of collusion among critical zones is similar to residents' monopsony
analysis performed in Section 3 and explained in Figure 3. Collusion reduces the
ight activity and augments the rents to residents living in the critical zones. In
turn other zones also benet from higher rents. An interesting question is about
26how the dispersion of ight across routes is aected by this collusion. For the sake
of the argument we can make the following simple analysis when all critical zones
collude. For simplicity, let us suppose that the market design sets the same number
of zone Z on each route and that the noise disutility is a quadratic function. Under
collusion, all critical zones are represented by a single representative who maximizes






















subject to the demand for noise licences given by  (P) =
P
r yr. In this expression,
r expresses the aggregate disutility within the critical zone of route r. We can









which is the same as in the competitive equilibrium reported in equation (4) in
Br echet and Picard (2010). So, in this example there is no ineciency in the route
allocation.
4.3 Reducing residents' rents
With no market for noise licenses residents are simply harmed by noise pollution.
By constrast, with such a market, residents are able to obtain a rent. The rent level
can nevertheless be reduced by using other forms of market institutions like an auc-
tion. In particular, an institution that would allow airline companies to discriminate
among the zones would diminish the rents to residents and would therefore allow a
larger number of ights. We here briey discuss this idea, which faces some di-
culties. First, the auction should not only be discriminatory but also combinatory.
Indeed, airlines companies must buy noise licenses over several zones by `blocks'.
Although such a feature is usual in electricity markets, it complicates a lot the im-
plementation of a market and therefore reduces transparency and acceptability, in
particular in the eyes of residents and their representatives. Second, the standard
auction theory is developed for the sales of a xed number of items. By contrast, the
main focus of our paper is about endogenizing the number of noise licenses oered by
residents. It is precisely the residents' ability to choose the number of noise licenses
over their zones that creates their rents. The benet of this ability is the revelation
of their information about their actual noise disutility. Third, an auction could elicit
information about airlines' ight protability rather than about residents' disutility.
27To make this idea clearer, let us suppose a unique route with two zones, each one
holding a noise license. Then, a (combinatory) auction will give the two licenses to
the airline company that bids the highest amount of money. The auction will thus
have revealed the prot of airline companies and city-pair connections, but not the
disutility levels over zones.
It is nevertheless interesting to pursue this strategy of a rent reduction by as-
suming the existence of an institution that is able to perfectly discriminate among
residents. Therefore, airline companies are assumed to collude perfectly. We now
want to stress that such an institution relaxes the residents' rents. Let us as-
sume full information and full bargaining power to airline companies and let the
zones' representatives be presented \take or leave it" oers that are tailored to
the noise characteristics of their zone and that make them indierent between air-
craft noise and quietness. In our model, this implies that the zone z on route r
has a utility equal to Urz = przyrz   rzy2
rz=2 = 0. The price of a noise license
over the zone is given by prz = rzyrz=2. Since the number of ights is the same
for all zones z on route r (yrz  yr), the price to y over that route is equal to
Pr =
P
z prz = (
P
z rz)yr=2  Bryr=2. Because routes are substitutes, the price
of any route should be equal so that P  Pr. From this one can see that the





s where y is the total number of ights. It can be checked that
the latter formula corresponds to the planner's optimal spatial distribution among
routes (See equation (1) in Br echet and Picard 2010). So, an institution that per-
fectly discriminates among residents does not alter the spatial distribution of aircraft
activities. The total number of ights is given by the last city-pair connection that








This formula is identical to the socially optimal number of ights reported in equa-
tion (1) in Br echet and Picard (2010), when the planner puts a weight on the airline
activity that is the double of the one it puts on residents' disutility. In other words,
in this simple quadratic model, an institution that would leave no rent to residents
should be implemented by a social planner that values airline prots to the double
of residents' disutility. If the planner values airline prots more than that, noise
licenses are useless because the compensation required for residents' participation is
too large.
285 Conclusion
Noise pollution is a hot and topical societal problem for all major airports. Whereas
many airport authorities try to manage this problem using aircraft noise limitation,
aircraft movement procedures and land planning, they do not use instruments that
make airline activities internalize the noise disutility of the residents located below
the takeo and landing routes. By contrast, we propose to implement local markets
for noise licenses as a way to allow airlines internalize their harm on residents. In
those markets the supply of noise licenses is made by residents who are organized
in geographical zones under the aircraft routes (e.g. municipalities, districts, com-
munities, associations) and who are allowed to emit and sell noise licenses to airline
companies. In the equilibrium, the prices of noise licenses reect both the marginal
noise disutility of residents in various zones and the smallest prot made by the
aircrafts moving in and out airports. As the licenses for carbon or sulfur dioxide
emission, noise licenses oer interesting eciency properties.
In this paper we discuss various economic features of the management of noise
license markets around airports. We argue that the implementation of such markets
is robust to some important airport features. For example, aircraft heterogeneity
can be dealt with by a system of noise quota counts and wind contingencies by the
creation of formal or informal secondary markets for noise licenses. Noise licenses
aect airport activity in the same way as an endogenous tax on aircraft movements.
They therefore aect hub activities as a simple tax would do. When noise license
markets are introduced after airport extensions, the rent to residents can be limited
to the new aircraft activities. Nevertheless noise license markets raise some issues.
Although noise license markets do not generate victim activity in the short run, they
do so in the long run and necessitate specic urban planning restrictions around
airports. Also, markets for noise licenses may conict with airport managements as
they reduce the latters' rents when their airports operate under capacity constraints.
At this stage of the discussion, we do not believe that the present economic
theory of noise licenses can convince all the stakeholders involved in airport noise
issues. We however advocate the economic instruments that allow polluting parties
to internalize the harm on the victims have superior eciency properties. Noise
license markets are such instruments. They deserve a dedicated attention by policy
makers and further research in the eld of air transport management.
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